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THE 20TH ANNUAL CHARLES W. FROESSEL
INTRAMURAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
MOOT COURT COMPETITION
BENCH BRIEF
Heather A. Keane & Katherine T.L. Wren
Brief Statement and
Procedural Summary of the Case
Petitioners, Dr. Willamina Wallace and Ms. Murron McGregor,
a same-sex couple, brought this action against Respondent, the State of
Froessel ("Froessel"), alleging that (i) Froessel Marriage Statute
("FMS") § 186.5, forbidding same-sex marriage, and (ii) Froessel's
statute's § 167.20 and § 514.71 prohibiting assisted suicide, are
unconstitutional.
Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor are both well-respected
professionals in Froessel, which has a reputation of being a liberal state.'
Dr. Wallace specializes in pediatric oncology at St. Laughlin Memorial
Hospital. Ms. McGregor is an architect for the Housing Department of
the State of Froessel, which gives exceptional benefits to its employees.
In 1993, after living together for thirteen years, Dr. Wallace and
Froessel has attracted a large population of minorities due to its reputation.
Isabella Yorks, Minority Population Soars Again In Froessel, FROESSEL TIMES, Oct. 8,
1995, at BI.
757
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
Ms. McGregor decided to marry. They wanted their union to become a
legally recognized marriage. Once their relationship was legally
recognized, Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor could enjoy the benefits of
marriage. These benefits include naming each other as the beneficiaries
of their respective estates and insurance polices.
Ms. McGregor's benefits package from Froessel includes a life
insurance policy that provides:
1. "Beneficiary" is defined as a legally recognized
spouse or child.
23. Benefits will be paid to a beneficiary if
the insured committed suicide; however,
no benefits will be paid to a beneficiary
who was involved in the suicide if a
valid state law prohibits assisted suicide
at the time of the suicide.
Thus, the only way Dr. Wallace can be the beneficiary of Ms.
McGregor's insurance policy is if they are legally married.2 Ms.
McGregor has no other beneficiary.'
When Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor applied for a marriage
license, the clerk at the State of Froessel Department of Health denied
their application because they are of the same gender. The clerk handed
them a copy of FMS § 186.5, which describes generally how marriages
can be valid in Froessel. It provides in pertinent part:
A marriage is valid only if it is solemnized and
registered, between an unmarried male and an unmarried
female, both of whom are at least eighteen years of age
Dr. Wallace's insurance policy provides similar requirements for beneficiaries.
Ms. McGregor was orphaned at fifteen. Likewise, Dr. Wallace has been
estranged from her family since she "came out."
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and not otherwise disqualified.'
Thus, FMS § 186.5 denies couples of the same gender the right to enter
into a lawful marriage.
The clerk then said to Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor, "Sorry.
As you can see, I can give marriage licenses only to heterosexual
couples." In a desperate attempt to obtain a license, Dr. Wallace told the
clerk that they were not "a homosexual couple, but a same-sex couple."
Indeed, Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor did not allege in their complaint
that they are homosexuals when they filed this suit; they alleged that
they are a same-sex couple. The clerk still denied Dr. Wallace and Ms.
McGregor a marriage license, and they left the Department of Health
distraught.
Unfortunately, their misfortune continued. After feeling ill at
the Gay Pride Parade on October 5, 1994, Ms. McGregor visited her
longtime physician Dr. Longshanks, a general practitioner. Dr.
Longshanks diagnosed Ms. McGregor with metastasizing lymphoma, a
fatal form of cancer. Afterwards, Ms. McGregor informed Dr. Wallace
(a pediatric oncologist) of the news.
4 FMS § 186.39, Requisites of Valid Marriage, provides that:
To make a marriage valid in this State, it shall be necessary that:
(1) The parties to the marriage are not related to each other by any degree,
brother and sister by whole or half-blood, uncle and niece, aunt and
nephew;
(2) at the time of contracting the marriage, each of the parties is at least
eighteen (18) years old;
(3) at the time of contracting the marriage, the man does not have any
.lawful wife living and the woman does not have any lawful husband
living;
(4) the man and the woman to be married obtained a license for the
purpose from the Department of Health, State of Froessel;
(5) the marriage ceremony to be performed in this State by an entity with
a valid license to solemnized marriages, in the presence of the man and
the woman to be married, with at least one third party present to
witness the marriage.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS.
Two weeks later, Dr. Wallace accompanied Ms. McGregor to
her next visit with Dr. Longshanks. At this visit, Dr. Longshanks
informed the women that he has spent his career researching
metastasizing lymphomas. Dr. Longshanks explained that metastasizing
lymphoma is a rapid killer and described some further effects of the
disease. Initially, Ms. McGregor would experience dizziness and
headaches due to the tumor at the base of her brain. As the disease
progressed, Ms. McGregor would suffer blackouts, have difficulty
speaking and moving, and the headaches would become debilitating.
Additionally, Ms. McGregor's lymph nodes and other organs would
swell as the cancer attached itself to these areas. Finally, Ms. McGregor
would experience excruciating pain as a result of these symptoms.
Ms. McGregor received a second opinion from Dr. Robert
Bruce, who also was researching lymphomas. He confirmed Dr.
Longshanks's diagnosis but informed Ms. McGregor that a perfected
cure was about a year and a half away.
One year after receiving the diagnosis, Ms. McGregor began
experiencing the effects associated with the disease's final stages. Ms.
McGregor asked Dr. Wallace to assist her in hastening her death because
her suffering became unbearable. Initially, Dr. Wallace was reluctant.
However, because Ms. McGregor said she would kill herself with or
without Dr. Wallace's help, she agreed to assist her in hastening her
death.
Ms. McGregor's request was not a surprise to Dr. Wallace. Ms.
McGregor had a living will which provided that she did not want to be
sustained by artificial means if she became incapable of
communicating.' Froessel, along with thirty-two other states, prohibits
assisted suicide. Both Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor knew this. The
Froessel statutes read:
' Froessel Health & Medicine Law ("FHM") § 80.383 permits competent adults,
by a living will and power of attorney, to elect in advance to reject life-sustaining medical
treatment. More than forty other states have also adopted living will statutes.
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Froessel Penal Law § 167.20:
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second
degree when that person intentionally aids
another person in committing suicide. Violating
this provision is a class C felony.
Froessel Penal Law § 514.71:
A person is guilty of promoting a suicide
attempt if that person intentionally aids a person
to attempt suicide. Violating this provision is a
class E felony.
In a written declaration witnessed by her attorney and two
paralegals, Ms. McGregor stated:
I am thirty-seven years old and have always prided
myself on being a hardworking and successful person.
I loved my job as an architect for the State of Froessel,
and it saddened me deeply when I had to leave it as a
result of having cancer.6 Before becoming sick I was
very athletic and independent. Now, unfortunately, I am
completely dependent on others, primarily on my
beloved Willamina Wallace. My disease has progressed
into the final stage and I am constantly in pain. I have
tumors ravaging my body, which have caused extreme
motor problems, making the simplest task difficult.
Although I have been prescribed painkillers, they are
basically useless. I live every moment of every day in
pain. I do not want to live like this any longer. I do not
6 Ms. McGregor's life insurance policy through the State of Froessel is still valid,
even though she is no longer working for the State.
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believe I will ever get better or that a cure will be found
before my death. Therefore, I want my long-time
partner and doctor, Willamina Wallace, to assist me in
hastening my death. We have agreed on the
arrangements and I am very comfortable with them.
Willamina Wallace will write a prescription for
Thonicane, which I will then obtain and take a lethal
dosage. I have chosen this method because it is quick
and painless. These are my wishes.
Dr. Wallace and Ms. McGregor filed suit seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief to compel Froessel to grant them a marriage license
and to permit Dr. Wallace to assist in Ms. McGregor's suicide. Dr.
Wallace and Ms. McGregor set forth two causes of actions. First,
Petitioners claim that Froessel violated the Equal Protection Clause by
not granting them a marriage license. Second, Petitioners claim that
Froessel violated the Due Process Clause by prohibiting Dr. Wallace
from assisting in Ms. McGregor's suicide. The district court granted
declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of the plaintiffs on both issues.
Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth
Circuit reversed the district court's decision and denied Plaintiffs'-
Appellees' declaratory and injunctive relief on both causes of action.
The Supreme Court grant certiorari.
Overview of Issue #1: Same-sex Marriage
What is the appropriate standard of review, under the
Equal Protection Clause, where Respondent constructed
a statute which restricts marriages to opposite-sex
couples, and under that standard, did Respondent violate
the Petitioners' equal protection rights?
Issue #1 involves the constitutionality of FMS § 186.5, which
762 [Vol, XIII
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restricts marriages to a man and a woman. The issue before the Court
is whether FMS § 186.5 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.7 The issue of whether same-sex marriage is a
fundamental right is not before this Court. However, the competitor
should mention that the Supreme Court has found that marriage is a
fundamental right. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
Because the term "sex" could mean gender, or "human
psychological and physiological characteristics or . . . sexual
orientation," FMS § 186.5 restricts marriages to opposite-sex couples
and therefore, arguably discriminates based on sex. Hopkins v.
Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 (4th Cir. 1996). Thus,
this Court may construe FMS § 186.5 to discriminate based on sex
because it prohibits same-sex marriage. If the classification under FMS
§ 186.5 is based on sex, the Supreme Court has held that the proper
standard of review for equal protection issues is intermediate scrutiny.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). However, if the
classification concerns homosexuals, federal and state courts have
concluded that the standard of review for equal protection issues is
rational basis. See. e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1624 (1996);
Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218, 1225 (11 th Cir. 1995). Recently, the
Supreme Court applied the rational basis standard when it reviewed a
Colorado amendment to its state constitution, which restricted the civil
rights of homosexuals. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1624.
The competitors must first address whether sex discrimination
exists to determine if the statute classifies based on sex or if it classifies
homosexuals. The competitors must then address the equal protection
issue for the classification under FMS § 186.5.
The Fourteerh Amendment provides, "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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Definition of Terms
To determine whether FMS § 186.5 discriminates based on sex,
the competitor must define the term "sex." If "sex" could mean "sexual
orientation" as the Fourth Circuit noted, see Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 749, sex
discrimination is plausible. However, FMS § 186.5 is a marriage statute,
and no court has defined "marriage" as a union between same-sex
couples! Moreover, Congress recently defined "marriage" strictly as a
relationship between a man and a woman. See Defense of Marriage Act,
142 Cong. Rec. H7480-05 (1996).
Equal Protection
No court has found that a marriage statute discriminates based
on sex, even though "sex discrimination"could mean "sexual orientation
discrimination," see Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 749, and same-sex sexual
harassmentmay be actionable. See, e.g., McWilliamsv. Fairfax County
Bd. of Super., 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.4 (4th Cir. 1996) (reserving decision
on same-sex sexual harassment due to division among federal courts);
Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995)
(stating that sexual harassment of "men by other men, or women by
other women," may be actionable). Indeed, courts have dismissed
actions that challenge the constitutionality of marriage statutes that
See. e.g., DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. 1984) (holding that
Pennsylvania does not recognize common-law same-sex marriage); Adams v. Howerton,
673 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982) (leaving question of whether Colorado permits
same-sex marriage for another case); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Wash. 1974)
(finding that denying same-sex marriages does not violate equal protection); Jones v
Hallahan, 501 S.W. 2d 588, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (finding no equal protection claim);
Baker, 191 N.W. 2d at 186 (holding that same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right).
Only the Hawaii Supreme Court has found that a marriage statute could discriminate based
on sex. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
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restrict marriages to opposite-sex couples.
Alternatively,FMS § 186.5 discriminates against homosexuals.
Recently, the Supreme Court struck down laws that limited
homosexuals'civil rights. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629. However, the
Supreme Court did not mention a homosexual's right to marry.
Standard of Review
Depending on which side the competitor is arguing, the
competitor will conclude that the correct standard of review is either
intermediate scrutiny or rational basis. The Supreme Court has
concluded that the proper standard of review for statutes that
discriminate based on sex is intermediate scrutiny. See Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1972). Thus, if the competitor argues that FMS §
186.5 discriminates based on sex, the competitor should argue that
intermediate scrutiny is the proper standard.
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly stated the
appropriate standard of review for equal protection of homosexuals, it
has demonstrated that rational basis is the standard. See Romer, 116 S.
Ct. at 1627. Moreover, when the class of people a statute affects is
homosexuals, courts apply the rational basis scrutiny. See, e.g., Shahar
70 F.3d at 1225; Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, appeal dismissed,
409 U.S. 810. Therefore, if the competitor argues that FMS § 186.5
discriminates against homosexuals, the competitor should argue that
rational basis is the proper standard.
Overview of Issue #2: Assisted Suicide/Hastening Death
Is there a liberty interest in assisted suicide, and if so,
does it outweigh the Respondent's asserted interests
under the appropriate balancing test and, therefore, does
FMS § 186.5 violate the Petitioners' due process rights
19971 765
766 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [VOl. XII
under the Fourteenth Amendment?
Issue #2 concerns the constitutionality of a state's statutes
prohibiting assisted suicide. In order to successfilly state a due process
challenge to the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court will be asked to
decide two issues: whether there is a liberty interest in assisted suicide
and, if so, whether under the appropriate balancing test the Petitioners'
interest outweighs the asserted state interest.9
The Supreme Court has never decided whether a state may
prohibit physician assisted suicide. However, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits in March and April of
1996 decided that a state may not prohibit physicians from assisting
patients to hasten their death when the patient is terminally ill and the
physician writes a lethal prescription. Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 838 (9th Cir. 1996); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d
716, 731 (2d Cir. 1996). However, while both courts found the state
statutes unconstitutional, they reached their holding based on different
legal grounds. The Ninth Circuit held that the state statutes prohibiting
assisted suicide were unconstitutional because they violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to terminally
ill patients who wished to hasten their own deaths with medication
prescribed by their physician. Compassion In Dying, 79 F.3d at 838. In
contrast, while the Second Circuit also found the state statute
unconstitutional, it did so based on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and rejected a due process challenge, finding
that there is no liberty interest in assisted suicide. Quill, 80 F.3d at 716.
9 In Reno v. Flores, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of due process includes a substantive component that forbids the government
from infringing on certain fundamental liberties, unless the infringement is narrowly
tailoredto serve a compelling governmental interest, thereby surviving strict scrutiny. 507
U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993). However, Flores did not take into account the line of cases that
used a balancing test, such as Cruzan, MiIls, or Younyberg. The proper standard of review
is a balancing test, not strict scrutiny, and therefore, competitors should not argue strict
scrutiny is the proper standard.
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Liberty Interest
The first step in the analysis of a due process challenge is
whether there is a constitutionallyprotected liberty interest. Courts have
taken different approaches as to how a liberty interest is determined.
One view is that a liberty interest exists when it is deeply rooted in the
history and tradition of this nation or explicitly stated in the constitution.
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,.503 (1976). The other
view is that a liberty interest exists when the interest is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such thatjustice would be impossible without
it. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
A competent person has a liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905). When the Supreme Court
was faced with the question of an incompetent person's right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment, it held that a state may require proof by
clear and convincing evidence that an incompetent person wishes to
withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment. Cruzan v. Director, Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
While the Supreme Court has never decided whether there is a
liberty interest in assisted suicide, the Ninth Circuit has held that there
is a liberty interest in deciding the time and manner of one's death.
Compassion In Dying, 79 F.3d at 816. However, virtually one month
after the Compassion In Dying decision, the Second Circuit found that
no liberty interest in assisted suicide exists, even in the limited case of
a mentally competent person who is in the final stages of terminal
illness and seeks the right to hasten death. Ouill, 80 F.3d at 724.
Balancing Test
Even if the right to participate in assisted suicide is a liberty
interest under the Due Process Clause, the inquiry would not be
complete; the interest must be balanced against the asserted state
19971 767
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interests. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 at 278. Froessel asserted the
following three state interests to support its statutes prohibiting assisted
suicide: (1) preserving life; (2) preventing suicide; and (3) avoiding the
influence of third parties.
The first interest Froessel asserted is in preserving life. A state
has as unqualified interest in preserving human life. Cruzan, 497 U.S.
at 282; Compassion In Dying, 79 F.3d at 817. However, this interest is
not absolute because its strength depends on the circumstances
presented. See id. The second interest Froessel asserted is the interest
in preventing suicide. The state has an even more pressing interest in
deterring the taking of one's own life. Id. at 820. While the state has a
legitimate interest in preventing suicide in general, that interest, like the
state's interest in preserving life, is substantially diminished in the case
of terminally ill, competent adults. Id. The final interest Froessel
asserted is avoiding the influence of third parties. The state may take
steps to minimize the danger of third-party influence, the state cannot
wholly eliminate these dangers; the interest should be treated seriously
in a balancing test. Id. at 827.
PETITIONERS' ARGUMENT
Issue #1: Same-sex Marriage (Speaker #1)
Injunctive Relief
Speaker #1, who is arguing on behalf of the couple, must
remember that Petitioners seek an affirmative injunction to compel
Respondent to grant them a marriage license. Petitioners should
recognize that in order to win, Petitioners must show that FMS § 186.5
discriminates based on sex and that it does not satisfy the intermediate
scrutiny standard of review.
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Definition of Terms
Petitioners must argue that the term "sex," although generally
regarded to mean gender, could mean sexual orientation. See Hopkins,
77 F.3d at 749. To make Petitioners' argument more credible,
Petitioners should mention that where the term "sex" is used in sexual
harassment cases, "sexual harassment" has been expanded to include
"same-sex sexual harassment." See, e.g., McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195
n.4; Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430. Hence, if "sex" could mean "sexual
orientation," FMS § 186.5 discriminates based on sex because it
prohibits same-sex marriages.
Equal Protection
Petitioners must argue that FMS § 186.5 discriminates based on
sex because it prevents same-sex marriages. Sex is an immutable
characteristic, like race or national origin, and a state should not impose
a disability "upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex."
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Furthermore,
marriage is "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free" people,
and should not be denied to any person. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. Thus,
when a same-sex couple is prohibited from marrying, the marriage
statute provides "dissimilartreatment for men and women who are thus
similarly situated." Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971); Frontiero,
411 U.S. at 683. Petitioners must then argue that Dr. Wallace and Ms.
McGregor are similarly situated to other couples in Froessel. However,
Froessel prohibits same-sex couples from marrying.
Petitioners could argue that the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr,
852 P.2d at 44, has acknowledged same-sex marriages. However,
Petitioners must concede that the Hawaii Supreme Court did not
explicitly endorse same-sex marriages. Rather, it remanded the case to
a lower court to determine whether Hawaii's marriage statute that
restricts marriages to opposite-sex couples can withstand strict scrutiny.
19971 769
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Id. at 68.
Petitioner should assert that when Respondent denies same-sex
couples the opportunity to marry, it also denies same-sex couples the
benefits that married opposite-sex couples receive. Such benefits
include the ability to file ajoint tax return, to obtain spousal support, and
to provide insurance coverage for a spouse. Denying same-sex couples
these benefits violates their civil rights. See. e.g., Romer, 116 S. Ct. at
1629.
Petitioners must also address that the "equal application"
doctrine violates the Equal Protection Clause. In Loving, the Supreme
Court rejected the notion that "the mere 'equal application' of a statute
containing racial classifications "prevents violating the Equal Protection
Clause. See 388 U.S. at 10. However, the Loving case concerned the
"equal application" doctrine to Caucasian and African-American people
in reference to a marriage statute that prohibited interracial marriages.
Petitioners must analogize the "equal application" in Loving to the
"equal application" of FMS § 186.5 to male couples and femalecouples.
Petitioners should also make policy arguments such as laws may
change as customs change. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63. Furthermore,
laws exist to protect citizens, not to restrict certain people from receiving
rights and benefits that other people are entitled to receive.
Standard of Review-Intermediate Scrutiny
Because Petitioners are arguing that FMS § 186.5 discriminates
based on sex, Petitioners will conclude that the proper standard of
review is intermediate scrutiny. See Craig 429 U.S. at 197. Petitioners
must argue that under an intermediate scrutiny standard of review, FMS
§ 186.5 must satisfy the following test: (1) FMS § 186.5 serves
important government objectives and (2) FMS § 186.5 is substantially
related to achieving those objectives. See id. The objectives Froessel
sets forth are: (a) preventing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases
("STDs") and (b) promoting procreation.
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1. Important Government Objectives
Petitioners must concede that Froessel satisfies this element
because its objectives are important. Preventing the spread of STDs
concerns "the protection of public health and safety, [which] represents
an important function of state and local governments." Craig, 429 U.S.
at 199-200. Procreation is also a valid objective because it is
"fundamental to the very existenceand survival of the race." Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Because procreation is possible
only between a man and a woman, FMS § 186.5 promotes thisobjective.
2. Substantial Relation
Petitioners must argue that even though Froessel can show that
its objectives are important, FMS § 186.5 nevertheless fails intermediate
scrutiny because it does not satisfy the "substantial relation" element.
The evidence Froessel presents does not support its contention that its
sex-based classification "closely serves to achieve that objective and
therefore the distinction cannot, under Reed, withstand equal protection
challenge." Craig, 429 U.S. at 200. See also Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
a. Preventing STDs
A statute such as FMS § 186.5 is unconstitutional as applied if
it "seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it
affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests."
Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. Petitioners must argue that Froessel has not
shown how preventing same-sex couples from marrying will reduce the
risk of spreading STDs; STDs are spread through sexual contact, not
marriage.
Furthermore, Froessel appears to be stereotyping homosexuals
by attributing STDs to homosexuality. The Supreme Court recently
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
found that stereotyping is impermissible. See United States v. Virginia,
116 S. Ct. 2264, 2280 (1996). Petitioners should argue that Froessel
should consider that marriage promotes stability and long-term
commitment. Thus, same-sex marriage will curtail the spread of STDs.
b. Promoting Procreation
Procreation is not always the result of marriage. Opposite-sex
couples who are infertile or are senior citizens who cannot reproduce are
not prohibited from marrying. Although marriages may dissolve for
lack of sex, the law does not require couples to have sex let alone
procreate. However, unmarried couples can and often do procreate.
Thus, Petitioners should argue that Froessel does not achieve its
"procreation" objective by permitting only opposite-sex marriages.
Note: If Petitioners cannot convince this Court that a statute that
discriminates against homosexuals is subject to intermediate
scrutiny, Petitioners will argue, in the alternative, that FMS §
186.5 is unconstitutionalbecause it is not rationally related to a
valid governmental interest. In making this argument,
Petitioners will raise the same concerns they did in arguing that
§ 186.5 fails intermediate scrutiny.
Issue #2: Assisted Suicide (Speaker #2)
Due Process Challenge of Prohibiting Assisted Suicide
Petitioners must argue that § 167.20 and § 514.71 of the Froessel
Penal Law curtail their liberty interest in assisted suicide/hastening
death. Additionally, Petitioners must argue that after balancing that
interest against the asserted state interest, the Froessel statutes violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Youngber
772 [Vol. XIII
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457 U.S. at 321; Mills, 457 U.S. at 299 (holding a challenge to the Due
Process Clause must be determined by balancing the individual liberty
interest against the relevant state interests).
Liberty Interest
Liberty interest are those implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, such that justice would be impossible without them. Palko, 302
U.S. at 326. Petitioners should argue against the proposition that liberty
interests are only those specifically enunciated in the constitution, or
rooted in history. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (holding that fundamental
liberties are those deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition).
Petitioners should also use previous cases where the Supreme Court has
identified and protected interests that are not specifically enunciated in
the constitution or deeply rooted in history. See, e.g. Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1992) (holding women have
a liberty interest in obtaining an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 497, 485 (1965) (holding that Connecticut law forbidding
contraceptive use unconstitutionally intrusive on rights of marital
privacy).
Petitioners should also argue that a strict historical or explicit
constitutional interpretation is rigid and freezes due process at a set time.
See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 804 (citing Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1952)). For example, if historical and explicit
constitutional interpretation was the sole guide, the Virginia anti-
miscegenation statute that this Court unanimously overturned in Loving,
388 U.S. at 12, as violative of substantive due process and the Equal
Protection Clause, would still be in force. Anti-miscegenation laws
were commonplace both when the United States was founded and when
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
77319971
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Balancing Test
Petitioners should also argue that, under a balancing test, the
liberty interest of assisted suicide/hastening death outweighs the three
asserted state interests of (1) preserving life; (2) preventing suicide; and
(3) avoiding the influence of third parties. Once a liberty interest has
been identified, the next step to determine whether there has been a
constitutional violation is to balance the liberty interest against the
state's interests. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279; Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 231;
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816.
1. Preserving Life
Petitioners should also argue that while Froessel has an interest
in preserving life, it does not outweigh an individual's right to hasten his
or her death. The state has an unqualified interest in preserving human
life. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282; Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 817.
However, this interest is not absolute because its strength depends on the
circumstances presented. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 817 n.
72.
Petitioners should argue that FHM § 80.383, which provides that
a competent person has a right to elect in advance to reject artificial life
support, adds to the strength of the argument that preserving life is not
absolute. In addition to Froessel, forty other states have adopted living
will statutes. Moreover, a competent person has the constitutional right
to refuse medical treatment. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (citing Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905)). Therefore, a state's
interest in preserving life is generally insufficientto override the wishes
of competent, terminally ill adult patient.
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2. Preventing Suicide
Petitioners must argue that while preventing suicide is a valid
state interest, it does not outweigh a terminally ill, competent adult's
decision to hasten death. Although Froessel provides for the involuntary
commitment of people to hospitals who attempt suicide, Froessel does
not have any law that prohibits suicide or attempted suicide. Therefore,
while Froessel may have an interest in preventing suicide, it is not
unparalleled, and it is not even codified. Additionally, Petitioners
should also argue that hastening death may not be suicide since there is
no discernable difference between terminating life support for a
terminally ill patient and giving a terminally ill patient the means to
hasten their death.
3. Avoiding Influence of Third Parties
Petitioners should also argue that while a state has valid
concerns about the effect of a third-party's influence on someone's
decision, it does not outweigh a patients right to be assisted in their
suicide by a doctor. Additionally, Petitioners may argue that the state
could impose restrictions to alleviate these concerns.
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT
Issue #1: Same-Sex Marriage (Speaker #3)
Injunctive Relief
Respondent, arguing on behalf of the State, must acknowledge
that if this Court finds that FMS § 186.5 discriminates based on sex, the
State will be compelled to grant a marriage license to Petitioners.
Accordingly, Respondent must argue that FMS § 186.5 does not
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
discriminate based on sex. Furthermore, Respondent must argue that
FMS § 186.5 classifies homosexuals, to whom a rational basis standard
of review is applied, and that the State satisfies rational basis review.
See, e.g., Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627; Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218,
1225 (11 th Cir. 1995).
Definition of Terms
Respondent must argue that the term "marriage" should be
defined before the term "sex" is defined. Respondent should indicate
that the "operative distinction lies in the relationship which is described
by the term 'marriage' itself and that relationship is the legal union of
one man and one woman." Sige, 522 P.2d at 1191. Respondent
should also indicate that courts are "only to ascertain and apply the
intent of Congress." Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040. Recently, Congress
expressed that marriage is to remain defined as a relationship only
between a man and a woman. See Defense of Marriage Act, 142 Cong.
Rec. H7481 (1996).
Respondent should indicate that sex discrimination cases involve
statutes that give "a mandatory preference to males over females," Reed,
404 U.S. at 74, or to females over males. Respondent may argue that
our forbearers wrote this country's laws to preserve the Judeo-Christian
tradition, which considers homosexuality deviant from traditional norms
of society.
Equal Protection
Sex discrimination cases challenged under equal protection
involve discrimination based on gender, not sexual orientation.
Respondent should argue that because FMS § 186.5 makes no
distinction between males and females, it does not discriminate based on
sex. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 75. Respondent should also argue that no
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court has held a marriage statute to discriminate based on sex. See. e.g.,
Sinie, 522 P.2d at 1195. Even the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr, did
not acknowledge that same-sex marriages are permissible; it remanded
the case to a lower court to determine whether Hawaii's marriage statute
that restricts marriages to opposite-sex couples can withstand strict
scrutiny. 852 P.2d at 68.
Even if the term "sex" could mean "sexual orientation," Dr.
Wallace and Ms. McGregor did not allege in their complaint that they
are homosexuals. Rather, they alleged that they are a same-sex couple.
Respondent should mention that "homosexual" is not necessarily
equivalent to "same-sex." These terms "are not synonymous." Baehr,
852 P.2d at 52 n. 11. Because "homosexuality" is characterized by one's
desire for a person of one's own gender, being a party to an opposite-sex
or same-sex couple has no bearing on one's sexual orientation.
Accordingly, "parties to 'a union between a man and a woman' may or
may not be homosexuals. Parties to a same-sex marriage could
theoretically be either homosexuals or heterosexuals." Id.
Respondent must argue that no analogy exists between "equal
application" of a statute based on race and "equal application" of a
statute based on homosexuality. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 10; Singer, 522
P.2d at 1191. In Loving, the marriage statute prohibited interracial
marriages. 388 U.S. at 4. Here, the relationship Dr. Wallace and Ms.
McGregor propose is not a marriage; "marriage" is a relationship
between a man and a woman.
Respondent should also mention that even though the Supreme
Court in Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629, granted homosexuals a wide range
of rights, the case did not give homosexuals the right to enter into a
same-sex marriage. Indeed, the Supreme Court held that homosexuals
have no right to privacy to engage in sexual acts. See Bowers, 478 U.S.
at 191-92.
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Standard of Review: Rational Basis
Respondent must argue that because the classification under
FMS § 186.5 is homosexuals, the proper standard of review is rational
basis. See, e.g., Romer, 116 S..Ct. at 1627; Shahar, 70 F.3d at 1225.
Under the rational basis test, a statute is constitutional if it is "rationally
related to the legitimate state interest." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,440 (1985). The legitimate state interests that
Froessel sets forth are: (1) preventing the spread of STDs and (2)
promoting procreation.
1. Preventing STDs
Respondent must state that preventing STDs is a valid state
interest. Respondent must then argue that marriage is an institution
between a man and a woman that promotes monogamy and stability.
Monogamy and stability arguably would prevent the spread of STDs.
Thus, the. statute is rationally related to this objective.
2. Promoting Procreation
Because procreation is possible only between a man and a
woman, FMS § 186.5 arguably promotes this objective. Respondent
should acknowledge that not all opposite-sex marriages result in
offspring, but "marriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily
because of societal values associated with the propagation of the human
race." Sne, 522 P.2d at 1195.
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Issue #2: Assisted Suicide (Speaker #4)
Due Process Challenge of Prohibiting Assisted Suicide
Respondent should argue that there is no liberty interest in
assisted suicide and, therefore, the Froessel statutes prohibiting assisted
suicide do not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is only after a liberty interest is identified that a court
may then balance the liberty interest against the asserted state interest.
Youngberg. 457 U.S. at 321. Therefore,the due process challenge fails
if this Court finds no liberty interest. However, Respondent should
argue in the alternative that even if there was a liberty interest in assisted
suicide, Froessel's interests outweigh the Petitioners' interests.
Liberty Interest
Respondent should also argue that there is no liberty interest in
assisted suicide. Quill, 80 F.3d at 724 (rejecting a due process challenge
to the state's statutes prohibiting assisted suicide). Respondent should
argue that the proper analysis to determine a liberty interest is whether
it is explicit in the Constitution or whether it is deeply rooted in this
nation's history and tradition. Moore, 431 U.S. at 502. Respondent
should argue that there is nothing in the Constitution that protects
assisted suicide, and our history and tradition reveal that suicide and
assisted suicide has been frowned upon since common law. The
common law of England, as received by the American colonies,
prohibited not only suicide but attempted suicide. Ouill, 80 F.3d at 724
(citing Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24
Duq. L. Rev. 1, 56-67 (1985)). Moreover, at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, at least twenty-one of the thirty-seven states
proscribed assisted suicide whether by state law or as a common law
offense. Michigan v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 731 (1994).
Respondent should further argue that this Court should not discover new
19971 779
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
liberty interests that are not clearly rooted in either text or history.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
Additionally, Respondent may argue that the interest in assisted
suicide is not implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. See Palko, 302
U.S. at 325 (holding fundamental liberties are those implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty such thatjustice would be impossible without
them). Respondent should argue that prohibiting assisted suicide is not
counter to the concept of ordered liberty. Finally, Respondent should
make the argument that federal courts do not have business in this field
and that this is a state matter. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 293 (Scalia,
concurring).
Balancing Test
Only after a liberty interest has been identified may a court
balance the liberty interest against the asserted state interest.
Youngberg 457 U.S. at 321. Respondent should, however, argue in the
alternative that, even if assisted suicide were a liberty interest protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the interest in
assisted suicide does not outweigh Froessel's interests.
1. Preserving Life
Froessel's strong interest in preserving the lives of its citizens
outweighs an individuals interest in assisted suicide. Generally, a state
may assert an unqualified interest in preserving life. Cruzan, 497 U.S.
at 282. Respondent should argue that Froessel has properly asserted its
interest in preserving life by having statutes which prohibit a third-party
from assisting in the death of another.
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2. Preventing Suicide
Respondent should argue that its interest in preventing suicide
outweighs the individual's interest in assisted suicide. Respondent
should point to the Limke study preformed by the Froessel Department
of Health and Hospital Service, which found that suicide is the second
leading cause of death in young people ages fifteen to thirty-four, and
one of the top five causes of death in people ages thirty-five to fifty-four.
Respondent should argue that suicide is a real and distressing problem
and therefore, the state has a legitimate interest in preventing it.
Moreover, the Respondent should argue that the Limke Study, which
stated that fifty-one percent of all suicides are not committed because of
terminal illness but because people are suffering from treatable mental
disease, shows that the state does have a strong interest in preventing
suicide.
3. A voiding the Influence of Third Parties
Respondent should argue that the state's interest in avoiding the
influence of third parties outweighs the interest of assisted suicide. A
state may properly, and has in this case, assert an interest in prohibiting
even altruistic assistance to a person who contemplates suicide.
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 825. The danger in allowing third
party involvement in a suicide is that the third party may exert undue
influence. This influence could lead to people killing themselves for
reasons other than severe pain and imminent death. These reasons
include, but are not limited to, economic strain, guilt, burdening
caregivers, and concern for loved ones.
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